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The Court last term built on Seminole Tribes' decision that Con-
gress could not abrogate state immunity when acting under the com-
merce power. Alden v. Maine2 held that sovereign immunity could
not be avoided merely by resort to state court. And the two Florida
Prepaid cases3 indicated that state violations of federal statutes are not
automatically violations of the Fourteenth Amendment that would al-
low Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity. Rather, a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment would occur-and Congress could abro-
gate state sovereign immunity for a statutory violations-only when
the states had systematically failed to provide adequate remedies4 for
intentional deprivations5 of traditional property interests.6
* Professor of Law, Tulane University; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard
University (Fall 1999). My thanks to Michael Collins, Richard Fallon, and Dan
Meltzer for comments on earlier drafts.
1 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
3 College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S.
Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
4 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206. The violations as well as the failure to
remedy might need to be systemic. See id. at 2207 (stating that Congress had not
identified a pattern of patent infringement by states).
5 See id. at 2209 (noting that Congress did not focus on instances of intentional
or reckless infringement on the part of the states).
6 In Florida Prepaid, the Court indicated that Congress could in a proper case
invoke Section 5 to protect a patent. See id. at 2208. In College Say. Bank, the Court
indicated that no due process violation was involved in the state's violation and
nonremediation of the Lanham Act, because the statutory expectations had not cre-
ated a property interest that excluded others. See College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at
2224-25. The Court indicated that trademark infringement might involve a property
interest. See id. at 2224; see also RicHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLR'S
THE FEDERAL CouiTs AND THE FEDERAL SysrEM 40 (4th ed. Supp. 1999) (noting that
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These decisions have generally evoked reactions of alarm,
although some have indicated that the decisions are no big deal.
7 I
place myself squarely among the no-big-deal camp. The reason is
partly that the tradition of individual rather than state liability, as it
has evolved in the Court's decisions, has proved reasonably effective
in accommodating the constitutional requirements of governmental
accountability on the one hand and sovereign immunity on the other.
To restate the obvious, many people view § 1983 actions against state
officers as providing an adequate system of remedies, even though
they do not entail state liability for damages.8 Indeed, it would have
comported with historical understandings had the Court not recog-
nized congressional power to abrogate state damages immunity under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it did in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,9 but rather required Congress to adhere to the individual liabil-
ity model.10 In any event, the Court has stuck close to an individual
liability model even when it has permitted abrogation of state immu-
nity. It has allowed Congress to substitute state liability for individual
liability in cases where there would be a viable claim for individual
liability under traditional common law principles, and where damages
liability has a strong historical and normative claim to being constitu-
tionally required."
Parts I and II of this Article provide a historical defense of the
Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions. They argue respectively
that historically the Court did not treat sovereign immunity as a mere
forum allocation device, and that the historical record provides strong
support for constitutional compulsion of damages remedies for depri-
College Savings Bank may suggest limits to the extent to which the 14th Amendment
protects statutorily-created entitlements as "new property").
7 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERALJURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 155-56 (1999).
8 SeeJohn C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 53 (1998) (indicating belief that our constitutional tort regime based
on fault reflects wise policy); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and Sovereign Im-
munity, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 47 (noting there was something to the Seminole Tribe
majority's observations that the nation had survived for nearly two centuries without
the question of power to abrogate sovereign immunity being presented to the Court).
9 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
10 See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 21 (stating that the Reconstruction Amendments
could not have had the purpose of overruling 11th Amendment sovereign immunity,
because the recognition of that immunity was only given in subsequent decisions);
Carlos Manuel Vizquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE LJ. 1683,
1749 (1997) (questioning the result in Fitzpatrick).
11 Congress, however, may also provide for individual liability in other cases
where an appropriate claim for relief can be stated against the individual officer. See
Alden v. Maine, 119 S. CL 2240 (1999) (stating that suits may be pursued against
individual officers for "wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself").
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vations of old but not new property. Part III then addresses possible
objections to the historical arguments for the Court's distinguishing
old and new property for entitlement to damages remedies.
I. FoRUM ALLOCATION AND SovEREIGN IMMUNrrY
In Alden v. Maine,12 the Court repudiated the notion that sover-
eign immunity was a mere forum allocation device that allowed suits
against the State under federal law in the State's own courts. The
now-rejected forum allocation theory had some support in statements
from the Justices and commentators, and in some direct review cases
in which the Supreme Court seemed to require unwilling state courts
to supply remedies against the state. 13
But despite appearances to the contrary, precedent probably
does not support treating sovereign immunity merely as a forum allo-
cation device. Historically, the remedies that the Court forced states
to provide in state courts were similar to those that the federal courts
would provide and were subject to comparable sovereign immunity
strictures. To the extent the Court appeared to make the states invol-
untarily liable, the power was a variation on making individual officers
liable for traditional common law wrongs. I thus agree with Professor
Carlos V5,zquez that the Court's decisions requiring adequate reme-
dies in state court are based on the Court's ability to insist on reme-
dies against individual officers.14 I would emphasize, however, that
the ability to insist on such remedies was generally limited to trespass
12 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
13 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1988) (concluding that the 11th Amendment
in federal question cases is primarily a forum allocation device); Henry Paul
Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv. L. REv. 102, 122 (1996) (stat-
ing that the l1th Amendment serves primarily as a forum allocation device); see also
Vgzquez, supra note 10, at 1689 (citing possible support for this proposition); Ann
Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE
LJ. 77, 153 & nn.393-94 (same).
14 See Vfzquez, supra note 10, at 1724, 1771, 1778. Professor V~zquez would lo-
cate a constitutional requirement of individual damages liability in the Supremacy
Clause, rather than in the Due Process Clause. See id. at 1782. His reason for prefer-
ring the Supremacy Clause is to avoid the possible problem that a right to damages
under the Due Process Clause might lead to individual liability even under statutory
schemes where Congress had not created damages liability. See id. The Court's re-
cent sovereign immunity decisions, by limiting the "property" that Congress may pro-
tect under the Due Process Clause and the circumstances under which Congress may
protect it under Section 5, may have obviated the problem of overly expansive dam-
ages remedies under the Due Process Clause.
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and related cases. 15 First I shall review the remedies that federal courts
provided to redress government illegality and then compare the reme-
dies that the Supreme Court imposed on state courts in direct review
cases.
A. Lower Federal Court Remedies Against Officers
As David Engdahl16 and David Currie17 have described, the fed-
eral courts provided damages remedies by way of common law actions
against individual officers.' 8 Individual officers remained liable for
their torts under general agency law, even if they were working for a
disclosed principal-the state.19 Negative injunctions were also avail-
able against individual officers to prevent imminent trespasses. By
contrast, under general private law agency principles, an agent was
not individually liable for damages when contracting for a disclosed
principal. Thus state officers could not be held personally liable for
state nonpayment of debts or be compelled specifically to perform
state contracts.
It is helpful to add to the tort/contract distinction that assumpsit
actions against individual tax collectors for payments made under pro-
test were accommodated to the tort side of the line.20 In effect, the
assumpsit action was a civilized version of the tort action that could
have resulted if the collector seized property to satisfy the allegedly
illegal tax. The payment under protest and assumpsit action substi-
tuted for the forcible seizure and trespass action.
21
15 That the Court supplied remedies in cases of trespass and not for disappointed
expectations lends support to the Court's reliance on the Due Process Clause as a
source of a right to an adequate system of remedies for old (but not new) property
deprivations. See infra text accompanying notes 56-67.
16 See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Government Wrongs,
44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 41-47 (1972).
17 See, e.g., David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government Of-
ficers, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 149, 153.
18 This is not to say that these actions were merely a reflection of the private law
rather than a law of government remedies. See DanielJ. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEo. L.J. 2537, 2554 (1998) (noting that within the forms of
action recognized by general law were distinctive proceedings directed against official
actions so as to keep government within the bounds of law).
19 Statutory authority for their action would provide no defense to a tort claim if
the statute was unconstitutional or if the officer acted beyond statutory authority. See,
e.g, Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209 (1877) (holding the captain liable for damages for
a seizure taking place outside of statutory jurisdiction).
20 See Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE
W. Rzs. L. REv. 396, 414 n.87 (1987).
21 See Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 136-37 (discussing assumpsit as a substitute
for trespass action).
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The individual liability scheme was consistent with a moderate
notion of dual sovereignty: the federal government should direct its
regulations directly to the people, not to the states.22 Among the peo-
ple whom it could regulate, however (particularly as to negative
prohibitions),23 were the people who were state officials. 24
Although the tort and assumpsit actions that the federal courts
entertained against state officers were often brought in diversity, the
federal courts frequently ignored state law that might have impeded
such suits. 25 For example, in Deshler v. Dodge,26 the Court allowed a
plaintiff to bring a replevin action challenging a state tax, despite the
state law's disallowance of replevin actions in tax cases.27 Rather, the
federal courts followed a general common law of remedies against
government officers.28 These diversity damages actions were the pred-
ecessors of federal question constitutional tort actions.
22 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2247 (1999); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 88-89 (noting the fundamental principle
that "the federal government is a sovereign coexisting in the same territory with the
states," acting directly on citizens); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State
Standing, 81 VA. L. REv. 387, 437-38 (1995) (discussing desirability of state and fed-
eral governments using their own enforcement machinery so as to enhance vitality of
states as self-sufficient institutions as well as accountability).
23 See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1860) ("[T]he Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as
such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it."); see also Michael G. Collins,
Article IU Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 39,
46 (suggesting constitutionally-based limits on the federal government's ability to use
state governmental decisionmaking structures). But see Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219 (1987) (overruling Dennison's holding that states could not be required to
extradite criminals); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79
VA. L. REV. 633 (1993) (claiming that the Framers thought Congress could use state
instrumentalities to govern); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79
VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993) (same).
24 See, e.g., ExparteVirginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (allowing federal prosecution of
state judge for racial exclusions from juries).
25 See generally Woolhander, supra note 21, at 84-111 (discussing use of diversity
to develop federal rights and remedies).
26 57 U.S. (16 How.) 622 (1853).
27 See Woolhandler, supra note 21, at 108 (discussing Deshler). A state statute re-
quired an affidavit that the property in question was the plaintiff's and had not been
taken "for the payment of any tax ... assessed against the plaintiff." Deshler, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) at 633 (Catron, J., dissenting) (quoting the state statute). Although the
plaintiff provided such an affidavit, it was only technically true, because the taxpayer-
bank whose property had been seized for taxes had assigned the seized property to a
diverse non-taxpayer. See id. at 623.
28 See Woolhandler, supra note 21, at 100-11; Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner.
Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TuL. L. REv.
(forthcoming Mar. 2000).
200ol
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. Remedies Against States on Direct Review
Turning now to direct review cases under section 25 of the 1789
Judiciary Act, did the Court force unwilling states to entertain actions
against themselves or only against their officers as they did in federal
courts? If the Supreme Court forced the state courts to entertain ac-
tions against the states themselves, that would show that the Eleventh
Amendment was a forum allocation device.
In the direct review cases, it sometimes appears that the Supreme
Court was forcing the states to entertain damages remedies against
themselves. But on closer examination, many such cases are merely
examples of the Supreme Court's taking the state courts as it found
them-and it found them entertaining causes of action against the
states. In these cases the state courts had recognized remedial rights
against the state but had decided against state liability based on the
merits of a federal issue and not based on a decision that no action
would run against the state regardless of the merits.
For example, in Curran v. Arkansas,2 9 the Supreme Court enter-
tained a suit to require the State to restore the capital stock to a bank
that the State by legislation had withdrawn. The Arkansas courts had
treated the State as amenable to suit but had denied relief on the
merits of the Contracts Clause claim.30 True, the State was a defend-
ant in a state court action involving essentially a monetary liability,
and the Court reversed on the merits of a federal question that was
decisive in making the State liable, but that did not mean that the
Court was abrogating the State's immunity. Such cases can be justi-
fied on a notion of consent-although the State's consent to be sued
in its own courts could not be so limited that the Supreme Court
could not review federal questions arising within the context of those
state court actions. Such review is necessary to allow states to structure
their own judicial institutions, while allowing the Supreme Court the
final word on issues of federal law.
In cases such as Curran, the state courts proceeded as if there
were a remedial right against the state for the particular claim. Occa-
sionally, however, the state court did not so much erroneously decide
the merits of the underlying substantive federal question, but rather
decided that there was no remedial right in its courts for the particu-
lar claim.31 In such cases during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the Court would not force causes of action against the state
29 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 309, 315 (1853).
30 See id. at 309, 315-16; see also Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 151 n.384.
31 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1786 (1991).
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itself that the state courts refused to recognize. 32 But it did force the
state courts to recognize claims against individual officers. And it did
so along the same lines as the common law actions that lower federal
courts entertained against state and federal officers in diversity (and
later federal question) actions.
For example, in Poindexter v. Greenhow,33 the state legislature had
abrogated trespass remedies against tax officers who seized property
for payment of taxes when the taxpayer had offered coupons on state-
issued bonds that the State had previously promised to accept for
taxes. 34 The Court, however, required the State to continue to pro-
vide a remedy against the individual officer. This contrasted with the
Court's allowing states to abrogate remedies against themselves, even
where those remedies existed at the time the state contracted with
bondholders.3 5 In Poindexter, moreover, the Court seemed to indicate
that the State might have to make general tort remedies available in
the first place. As the Court put it, "No one would contend that a law
of a State, forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to prop-
erty, would be upheld in the courts of the United States, for that
would be to deprive one of his property without due process of law."'3 6
In other cases, the Supreme Court forced states to provide tax refunds
from non-sovereign defendants37-which again paralleled the tort
32 See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 340 (1879) (holding that
legislative repeal of a statute providing for a seemingly enforceable judgment against
the State was not a Contracts Clause violation, even as to contracts entered while the
statute was in force). See generally Woolhandier, supra note 21, at 117-18 &
nn.205-12, 123 & nn.240-44 (discussing the Court's allowing states to repeal reme-
dies against themselves, as well as positive-law based remedies against their officers).
33 114 U.S. 270 (1884). See generally VWzquez, supra note 10, at 1736 (discussing
Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 270, as supporting an immunity-from-liability rather than a fo-
rum-allocation interpretation of the 11th Amendment).
34 The case could be viewed as merely restoring a state remedy that was effectively
part of the State's contract at the time it was entered, and thus as preventing a Con-
tracts Clause violation. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 303-04. The Court, however, had
allowed the State more leeway to repeal remedies providing relief against itself or
affirmative relief such as mandamus against its officers. See Woolhandler, supra note
21, at 117-19.
35 See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) (stating that the
state grant of permission to be sued is voluntary and can be withdrawn); see also supra
note 32.
36 Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 303.
37 See Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (requiring state
court to entertain assumpsit action despite state court's holding that payments were
voluntary and that there was no statutory action to recover the tax payments); see also
id. at 24 (suggesting due process required the action for refund of an unlawful tax
collected by coercive means); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930) (holding
that denial by state court of the recovery of taxes exacted by compulsion and in viola-
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and assumpsit actions available in federal courts when federal jurisdic-
tion existed.3
8
One might here object that at least in modem tax refund cases,
the Court has forced lawsuits against the states themselves in the teeth
of state refusals to accord remedial rights against themselves. 39 In
Reich v. Collins,40 for example, the Court compelled a monetary rem-
edy against the State in a tax refund case that the state court had de-
clined to provide. The State had done so not because of a mistake as
to substantive constitutional law but because of its decision that, as a
matter of state law, refunds should not be available for taxes paid
under statutes declared unconstitutional only subsequent to payment
of the taxes.41 The Supreme Court indicated that a refund remedy for
an illegal tax was constitutionally required. But it does not necessarily
follow that the remedy constitutionally required must be against the
State itself. The Supreme Court has provided a not altogether satisfy-
ing dodge of this issue by explaining Reich as a case where the State
promised a remedy and was thus bound to deliver.42 But if no retro-
spective damages remedy were constitutionally required against the
State itself, it may be questioned what difference the State's promise
makes.
With a few added steps, however, the Court's requiring a remedy
against the State in Reich makes sense and reinforces an individual
liability model. The Court's ability to force a remedy against the state
in cases such as Reich derives from the Court's ability to compel a rem-
edy against individual officers, particularly suits against collectors for
illegal payments made under protest. In other words, in response to
tion of federal Constitution or law contravenes the 14th Amendment); cf Iowa-Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (reversing a state court's denial of
a refund remedy where a state official had exacted taxes in violation of state and
federal law).
38 SeeAtchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1912)
(allowing federal court assumpsit action against a state collector).
39 See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1784 n.283 (indicating that states
may not be constitutionally allowed to assert immunity in their own courts in tax re-
fund and takings cases); Meltzer, supra note 8, at 57-58 (stating that tax cases provide
the strongest support for congressional ability to abrogate sovereign immunity in state
court, but that no decision had unambiguously held that states could not invoke sov-
ereign immunity).
40 513 U.S. 106 (1994).
41 See id. at 109; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1824-29 (arguing that
such concerns might suffice to deny a remedy).
42 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2259 (1999) (stating that a state cannot
withdraw an apparently clear and certain remedy after taxes have been paid in reli-
ance on that remedy).
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the State's refusal to provide an adequate remedy for illegal taxes paid
under protest, the Court could provide for an action against the indi-
vidual officer in federal or state court.
Of course, in Reich, the remedy the Court ordered ran against the
State itself. But when the state, as in Reich, has made clear that it
wants to be the defendant in such suits, it makes sense for the Court to
assume that the state would prefer to make remedies available against
itself rather than against the officer. 43 The Court's rationale that lia-
bility against the state is justified by its promise of a remedy makes
some sense, in that the state, by making itself a defendant in the re-
fund suits, has led the taxpayer not to seek remedies against individual
officers. 44 Absent such a substitution by the state of itself as defend-
ant, the taxpayer might have successfully brought an assumpsit action
against the officer, or a trespass action if his property was seized.45
Similarly in the Parrat1 6 line of cases, the Court indicated that
the State as a matter of due process may be required to provide an
adequate system of remedies for some intentional torts by state of-
ficers.47 Again, the Court's implicit power to compel the state to pro-
vide remedies in such cases seems derivative of a theory of individual
liability of officers. Similarly, the ability to force an action against the
officer for deliberate trespassory harms48 may be the basis for forcing
states to provide adequate remedies for takings of property.49 Tres-
43 See Vdzquez, supra note 10, at 1771-73 (reading McKesson Corp. v. Division of
Alcoholic Beverages, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), as establishing a remedy against the individual
officer, although the action can be against the state if the state designates itself as the
party); Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 152-54 (offering a similar interpretation of the
Court's direct review of tax refund cases).
44 If the state proceeded by an enforcement action, the taxpayer could have
raised his constitutional claims defensively. The taxpayer, however, does not always
have this option, because the state may seize property without his assent.
45 Because the remedy would be constitutionally compelled, the Court's current
doctrine would allow Congress to provide a remedy against the state in appropriate
circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
46 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) (holding that the state did not violate due process in not providing remedy for
merely negligent deprivation of property by state officer); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984) (holding that no § 1983 remedy was available for intentional destruction
of inmate's property because state's post-deprivation procedure satisfied due
process).
47 See Vfzquez, supra note 10, at 1771 (noting that the Parratt line of cases re-
quires post-deprivation remedies against officers).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
49 See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nine-
teenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VADm. L. REv. 57, 62-65 (1999) (stating
that just compensation provisions limited the competency of the legislature to abolish
200
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pass and ejectment 5 ° actions against individuals thus underly the
Court's seeming requirement5 ' that states supply damages remedies
against themselves for takings.
5 2
In summary, the Supreme Court's case law, driven by the need to
accommodate sovereign immunity and government accountability,
does not support a view that the Court itself has direct power to make
the states liable in their own courts. The Court, however, has held the
state liable in circumstances of deliberate invasions of property where
a traditional trespass or assumpsit action might have been brought
against an individual officer, but where the state had substituted reme-
pre-existing damages remedies without providing an adequate alternative, and dis-
cussing early common law trespass actions, as well as actions for ejectment and in
equity).
50 See Woolhandler, supra note 20, at 415 n.88 (1987) (citing ejectment actions
against individual officials).
51 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 316 (1987) ("[I]n the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is re-
quired by the Constitution."). As Professor Tribe has pointed out, however, Supreme
Court cases treating damages as a constitutionally required remedy for takings involve
counties, or cases in which relief against the United States was statutorily authorized.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERiCAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW 1738 n.18 (3d ed. 2000).
Tribe also notes that the "Court has also ruled that Congress may bar monetary suits
against the United States-even where it is alleged that a statute results in the taking
of property without just compensation." See id. (citations omitted).
52 The federal court cases against federal officers from the 19th century involving
real property seem to have primarily been ejectment actions, rather than damages
actions. See supra note 50. In the context of immovable property, ejectment would
generally supply effective relief. Comparable injunctive-type relief would be less effec-
tive for other types of deliberate trespass-e.g., illegal taxation, deliberate tort. The
use and efficacy of ejectment leads me to some uncertainty about the extent to which
a damages remedy was historically required for the loss of use of property prior to a
successful ejectment action. Nevertheless, the availability of damages in modem cases
for temporary physical occupations seems to fit well within a traditional tort model.
See First English, 482 U.S. at 318 (citing cases where temporary use was compensated).
I am more uncertain that damages should be required for regulatory takings, particu-
larly temporary regulatory takings, as the Court required in First English. See id. at
317-18 (noting the issue had not been previously resolved). Certainly when the Due
Process Clause began to address confiscatory rates by analogy to takings law, the prin-
cipal relief was injunctive. See, e.g., Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Regulatory
takings, as opposed to physical takings of real property, moreover, may possibly be
accommodated to deprivations of new rather than old property, which I argue below
do not necessarily require damages remedies. Temporary regulatory takings have in
common with many of the new property cases that the government may not have
internalized a benefit commensurate with the plaintiff's claimed loss (unlike the tem-
porary occupation of land cases). See infra text accompanying notes 115-29. Thus, I
tend to think that injunctive remedies might be constitutionally sufficient in tempo-
rary regulatory takings cases.
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dies against itself. If sovereign immunity is a constitutional constraint,
and one limiting both federal judicial and congressional power,
53
then the limitations on the Court's powers to impose liability directly
on the states imply similar limitations on Congress's power.5 4 By ex-
tension, the case law does not support Congress's treating sovereign
immunity as a mere forum allocation device.
5 5
II. THE NONEQUATION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
The Court in the F/orida Prepaid cases partly blocked another ave-
nue around Seminole by indicating that a state violation of a federal
statute would not pro tanto violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and become remediable by congressional abrogation
of sovereign immunity under Section 5. In cases involving statutory
violations rather than fundamental rights, 56 the Court indicated that a
due process violation would only occur and Congress could only abro-
gate sovereign immunity in cases of a systemic state failure to provide
remedies for deliberate deprivations of traditional property interests.
There are two prongs to the Florida Prepaid cases: first, identifying
when due process is violated by failure to provide damages remedies
53 Arguments that we can rely on the political process to preserve federalism
boundaries seem increasingly questionable. See DanielJ. Meltzer, State Sovereign: Five
Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAmE L. Ray. 1011 (2000) (expressing opinion
that the recent sovereign immunity cases may reflect the Court's disappointment in
congressional protection of federalism).
54 That the Court imposed only individual liability for constitutional violations
suggests that the state should not be liable at the instance of Congress for mere statu-
tory violations. To the extent the Court now allows congressional abrogation of im-
munity, it is to provide remedies for or prevent court-recognized constitutional (and
not mere statutory) violations.
55 Assuming there is a limitation on both Congress's and the courts' making
states directly liable, there is not a problem of state discrimination against federal
claims under Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). A state court would not be discrimi-
nating against a federal claim, even if the state allows state-law-based suits against the
state, because there is no valid federal claim directly against the state at the instance
of individual plaintiffs.
56 The standards that the Court applied, however, came from a fundamental
rights case. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that legislation
under Section 5 may prohibit conduct not itself unconstitutional if the legislation is
proportional and congruent to prevention or remediation of constitutional viola-
tions). Boerne, however, does not directly involve Congress's enhancing remedies for
a court-recognized fundamental rights constitutional violation. What is more, the
statute at issue in Boerne, in attempting to expand remedies for purported free exer-
cise violations, ran up against the Establishment Clause. See Meltzer, supra note 18, at
2549 (suggesting the statute at issue in Boerne involved an establishment of religion).
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for state violations of a federal statute; and second, the scope of con-
gressional power once the Court has identified such a violation. I will
primarily address the issue of defining a due process violation, where I
think the Court seems to get it right.
57
First, given the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe that Congress
lacks power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Com-
merce Clause, it follows that the Court would draw a line between
ordinary statutory violations and constitutional due process violations
in order to make the limitation on congressional powers stick. 8 Simi-
larly, to make a Supremacy Clause violation into a due process viola-
tion would provide an end-run around Seminole Tribe by allowing
Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity by legislating under the
Commerce Clause or any other power.
59
Assuming it makes sense to draw a line between mere statutory
violations and due process violations by state actors, the line that the
Court drew is plausible. The Court's holding that there is a constitu-
tional violation if there is a systemic failure to remedy deliberate state
violations impacting on traditional property interests matches up with
the areas where, at least from an historical perspective, there would be
a strong claim to a constitutionally required damages remedy.
The history of remedies described in Part I above indicates that
the federal courts provided remedies against officers60 where there
was a traditional intentional trespass but did not provide remedies of
payment on contracts or, perhaps more generally, for disappointed
57 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999) (indicating that legislation abrogating sovereign immunity
must respond to a widespread and persistent deprivation of constitutional rights); id
at 2207 (indicating that abrogation must be proportional to supposed remedial and
preventive objectives).
58 See Vzquez, supra note 10, at 1745 (noting that Seminole implies that Congress
may not merely create property rights by statute and then abrogate immunity under
them).
59 Cf Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (conclud-
ing that supremacy violations are actionable under § 1983 as statutory not constitu-
tional violations); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612-15
(1979) (concluding that allegations of incompatibility between federal and state stat-
utes did not give rise to a claim of deprivation of a right "secured by the Constitution"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1994)).
60 Reconstruction era congressional statutes themselves were directed to individ-
ual officers. Cf Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (discussing legislative history of
what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)). Congress itself did not seem to think it had
power to make states directly liable, well into the regulatory era. In Parden v. Terminal
Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a congressional statute
created damages liability against a State, by reading the language "every common car-
rier" to include the State if it operated a railroad in interstate commerce.
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expectations of profit.6' Although the remedies that the federal
courts traditionally provided against government officers provide
some indication of what remedies were constitutionally required, it
helps to consider the remedies that the Supreme Court forced on
state courts as well. Remedies historically forced on state courts have
more certainty of constitutional compulsion behind them because the
Supreme Court did not exercise general common law powers that
might go beyond constitutional necessity in direct review cases. In ad-
dition, it might be possible that the remedial deficiencies of federal
courts, particularly in supplying remedies against the states them-
selves, might be made up for in state courts. 62 For example, the lack
of damages actions for breach of state contracts in federal courts
might (hypothetically) have been addressed by compelling state
courts to entertain contract actions against themselves or their
officers.
But, as noted above, the Supreme Court only forced the states to
provide remedies in state courts that were similar to those available in
federal courts. Actions for deliberate invasions of traditional property
interests were available against individual state officers in both state
and federal courts, while actions for nonpayment of state contracts
and other disappointed expectations were not. It is in the cases of
deliberate trespasses, then, that history most strongly supports a claim
that due process requires a monetary remedy.
"Deliberate" does not, however, necessarily mean in all contexts a
mens rea as to the illegality of government action, even though negli-
gence as to illegality is the standard to overcome individual officers'
qualified immunity from damages liability under § 1983. For exam-
ple, unlawful taxation and eminent domain are among the deliberate
acts of state officers for which remedies are probably required without
61 Cf Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 123-25 (noting that the Supreme Court
allowed states to abrogate positive law as opposed to common law trespass remedies
that had been available at the time that the private party had contracted with the
state).
62 On the other hand, not forcing remedies on the states might not indicate that
such remedies were constitutionally unnecessary so long as the remedies remained
available in federal court. See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299
(1952) (granting an injunction against a tax violating a promise in a corporate char-
ter, after remedies in state court proved inadequate). The jurisdictional restrictions
on federal courts apart from sovereign immunity mean that some constitutionally
compelled remedies may end up having to be available in state courts. The issue here
is what general categories of remedies against officials are constitutionally required.
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regard to any official state of mind as to the law.63 In such cases, un-
just enrichment (admittedly of the state and not the officer) seems to
supply a strong ground for a compulsory wealth transfer from the
state or its officer without any additional state of mind requirements.
Similarly, in the tort area covered by Parratt, requirements of non-
negligent deprivations may have more reference to common law stan-
dards than to federal individual officer immunity standards of unrea-
sonable illegality, although unreasonable illegality may be present in
many such deliberate torts.
64
Even if the Court's definition of when a statutory violation
amounts to a due process deprivation is justifiable, one might fairly
object that the Court was unduly restrictive of Congress's powers
under Section 5.65 In the patent case, the Court might have reasoned
that Congress could provide a remedy against the State if the State's
hypothetical failure to provide a system of remedies would pose a due
process problem. Instead, the Court required Congress to have evi-
dence of some real and systemic failure. The reason to be so grudg-
ing is that the Court sees sovereign immunity as a constitutional
value66-just as it may have seen Establishment Clause values weigh-
ing against free congressional remedial power to expand remedies for
free exercise in Boerne.
67
III. CRITIQUES OF THE HISTORIcAL DEFENSE
In the Florida Prepaid cases, the Court indicated that the State's
persistent violation and failure to remedy patent infringements, be-
cause involving traditional "property" protected by the Due Process
63 See Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 150 (noting absence of good faith immuni-
ties in traditional common law actions against collectors as well as most actions for
tangible trespass).
64 Given that deliberate torts may involve mala in se, the requirement of a state of
mind toward the law may seem unnecessarily burdensome on the plaintiff. Cf John
C.Jeffries, Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88
MICH. L. REV. 82, 97 (1984) (noting that constitutional standards themselves have
various degrees of fault built in).
65 See also College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2234 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that doing business is a
form of property and congressional ability to abrogate should depend on whether
Congress has a reasonable basis for concluding that abrogation is necessary to prevent
violations).
66 See also Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254-55 (1999). Damages liability may
pose a threat to sovereignty. See id at 2264; see also infra text accompanying notes
115-19.
67 See Meltzer, supra note 18, at 2549 (suggesting that the statute at issue in Boerne
involved an establishment of religion).
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Clause, would constitute a constitutional violation that Congress could
address under Section 5.68 By contrast the Court treated the statutory
cause of action that Congress had created for false advertising as not
involving a "property" interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
69
A state's defeating of these statutorily created expectations of compli-
ance with federal law-what might be considered a form of new prop-
erty-therefore did not constitute a constitutional violation that
would allow Congress in an appropriate case to abrogate sovereign
immunity from damages.
The positive side of the Court's recent sovereign immunity deci-
sions is that, together with prior case law,70 they may be read as hold-
ing that the Due Process Clause has a substantive requirement of an
adequate system of damages remedies for deliberate 7' state depriva-
tions of old property in violation of federal statutes.7 2 The recent
cases also hold, however, that there is no such requirement for delib-
erate deprivations of new property-either in state or federal courts.7
3
The above discussion contains a historical defense of requiring the
states to supply (through themselves or their officers) damages reme-
dies in cases of traditional trespass but not in cases of defeated expec-
tations, thus lending support to the Court's distinction between old
and new property.
My reliance on history implies a belief that consistency in prece-
dent over time embodies collective understandings that should in-
form current decisions on these same constitutional issues: the scope
of sovereign immunity and its accommodation to the rule of law. The
history also reflects long-term judgments that individual liability for
trespass rather than government liability was not only doctrinally sup-
68 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999) (noting that patents had long been considered a species of
property).
69 See College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-25 (indicating that a hallmark of pro-
tected property is the right to exclude others and that statutory interest in being free
from false advertising was not an interest protected by the 14th Amendment).
70 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review,
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 CoLum. L. REv. 309, 311 (1993) (indicating that the
Parratt line of cases may be read as requiring states to maintain adequate systems of
remedies for violations of nonfundamental rights).
71 The Court includes a requirement of deliberateness in the definition of "de-
prive." See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2209.
72 See id. at 2208; see also Michael G. Wells, Suing States for Money: Constitutional
Remedies AfterAlden and Florida Prepaid, 31 RurGrS LJ. (forthcoming 2000) (stating
that Alden rests on the implicit premise that state courts must be open for certain
constitutional claims as a matter of due process).
73 See College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2224.
200]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ported but normatively acceptable 74-that it worked reasonably well
at controlling government and providing damages remedies where
the need for them seemed most insistent,75 without unduly undermin-
ing the financial integrity of the states.
Having given a history-of-doctrine defense, however, it is perhaps
incumbent upon me to address the possibility that more recent devel-
opments-that is, modem history-undermine my position. 76 The
new and old property distinction in the sovereign immunity cases
might be criticized as inconsistent with a number of developments in
due process law and constitutional remedies. First, the cases' narrow
definition of "property' protected by the Due Process Clause may
seem inconsistent with procedural due process cases that protect new
as well as old property. Second, the cases may be inconsistent with
modem developments in constitutional remedies in fundamental
rights cases that allow compensation for a broader range of injuries
than was protected at common law. And third, the cases may be in-
consistent with modem expansions of standing to include a wide
range of injuries in statutory cases against government, including in
administrative law and § 1983 claims alleging violations of federal stat-
utes (as distinguished from the Constitution).
I will address these possible inconsistencies below. On examina-
tion of these modem developments, some of the inconsistencies may
reveal themselves as more apparent than real. And even where the
inconsistencies are real, they may highlight the normative acceptabil-
ity of requiring the State to provide a system of monetary remedies in
cases of old but not new property deprivations. Providing damages
for old but not new property deprivations tends to provide a remedy
where the claims for corrective justice are stronger. In addition, al-
lowing compensatory damages for new property deprivations may at
74 See Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
t/on, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1202 (1987) (stating that argument from precedent
should be descriptively accurate and depict the data in a normatively attractive light);
id. at 1260 (stating that concern for moral and policy values is built into argument
from precedent).
75 See generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1736 (stating that constitutional
remedies must be adequate overall to keep government in check, and additionally,
should provide individual remediation).
76 Herein, I address more recent doctrine that might undermine the old and new
property distinction in the context of remedies against government. I will not address
modem doctrine that might have supported a forum allocation reading of sovereign
immunity because I believe that the cases suggesting that states are suable in state
courts should properly be seen as deriving from the Court's ability to impose individ-
ual liability on officers as discussed above.
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least in some cases produce undesirable consequences.7 7 Treating old
and new property as equivalent for damages remedies may dilute pro-
tections for old property. In addition, requiring compensation for
new property deprivations may pose a greater threat to state fiscal in-
tegrity than compensation for old property deprivations.
A. Definitions of Property for Due Process
1. Due Process Requirements of Damages Remedies
In the Florida Prepaid cases, the Court indicated that patent rights
were "property" protected by the Due Process Clause, while the cause
of action that Congress had created for false advertising was not such
"property" protected by the Due Process Clause.78 The F/orida Prepaid
cases thus seem to define new property (in the form of a statutorily
created cause of action or expectation of compliance with the law by
the state) as outside of the definition of property for some due pro-
cess purposes, while old property of course remains within the defini-
tion of due process property.79 This exclusion of new property may
seem inconsistent with procedural due process cases where the Court
has extended due process protections to certain statutory entitle-
ments. For example, the Court has characterized welfare benefits and
government jobs as due process "property" so long as their receipt is
hedged with sufficient restrictions on government discretion.8 0 At a
higher level of generality, the Court sometimes seems to protect as
part of "property" a statutory beneficiary's expectations of governmen-
77 John Jeffries has recently reminded us that limitations on damages can have
constitutional benefits (such as fostering constitutional development) as well as costs
(such as nonremediation of individual harms and lessened deterrence). SeeJohn C.
Jeffiies, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90 (1999)
(stating that limiting money damages fosters constitutional development and directs
limited societal resources toward future generations rather than past claimants).
78 See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119
S. Ct. 2219, 2224-25 (1999) (indicating that a hallmark of protected property is the
right to exclude others and that statutory interest in being free from false advertising
was not an interest protected by the 14th Amendment).
79 See id
80 See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); see
also FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 40. Entitlement theory displaced a grievous loss or
importance theory of interests protected by procedural due process. See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). To qualify for protection under entitlement theory, objec-
tive criteria may have to be strongly connected to receipt of the benefit. This concept
of property under entitlement theory could be generalized to include statutory bene-
ficiaries' expectations that state governments will comply with federal statutes, such as
the Lanham Act. The statutory standards enforced in ordinary litigation against pri-
vate parties would provide the requisite limitations on official discretion.
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tal compliance with statutory law.81 The Court thus appears to allow
nontraditional property to count as due process property in the proce-
dural due process context. Yet in the Florida Prepaid cases, it excludes
such property from "property" in the more substantive context of an
entitlement to damages from the state for federal statutory
violations.
8 2
Entitlement theories that allow for procedural due process pro-
tection of new property have been subject to a number of criticisms,
some of which are discussed below. But even accepting entitlement
theories of property for procedural due process as a given, perhaps
the real issue is not so much how to define property as to identify
when the Due Process Clause requires a damages remedy for a depri-
vation of various kinds of property-old property, entitlements, and
other statutory expectations of governmental compliance with law.8 3
Many liberty and property interests that are protected by due process
do not provide the basis for a damages remedy against the state.8 4 At
a semantic level, one might resolve the inconsistency of the different
81 See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due
Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85, 85 (suggesting due process primarily guarantees com-
pliance with positive law); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan: Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MicH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (arguing that statutes
could create property interests in citizens' interests in seeing government enforce the
law); cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding that state law
that extinguished state employment discrimination claims when the agency failed to
hold a factfinding conference within 120 days deprived the claimant of property pro-
tected by due process). In addition, we normally think of plaintiffs in lawsuits who are
enforcing statutory expectations, and not merely defendants who may be subject to
forced transfers of wealth, as having procedural due process protections. See id. at 429
(stating that Due Process Clause protects civil litigants, both plaintiffs and defend-
ants). But cf Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) (Portal to
Portal Case) (upholding congressional enactment that overturned Court interpreta-
tion of Fair Labor Standards Act providing overtime for certain transportation time).
82 See Fallon, supra note 70, at 342-43 (stating that Parratt involved substantive
due process, although noting that claims of substantive arbitrariness can be trans-
formed into complaints about procedure); see also Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Com-
mon Law Torts: Empathy for Parratt, Hudson and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. REv. 813, 856
(1987) (indicating that judicial requirement of a remedy may enlarge the property
interest granted by the government).
83 Cf Fallon, supra note 70, at 319-20 (stating that a set of categories based on
fundamentality of interests could not capture what the Supreme Court does in sub-
stantive due process; rather, the results are based on precedent and moral intuitions
the Court believes are widely shared); id at 357 (stating that in our constitutional
tradition, remedies will vary with the right at issue and the context in which it is
asserted).
84 See generally id. at 329 (discussing variations in remedies required for due pro-
cess violations).
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definitions of property by recognizing that entitlements and expecta-
tions created by statutes as well as traditional property may all be
"property," but that due process is satisfied by a different system of
remedies based on the different types of property at issue.85
As noted above, the issue is best characterized as one of substan-
tive due process-when does due process require a damages remedy
or at least an adequate system of damages remedies. It would not be
odd if due process required retrospective damages remedies for a
more limited type of property than the full range of property for
which due process may require injunctive relief or a system of nonju-
dicial hearings.86 A greater imperative for injunctions over damages
informs our whole system of remedies against government.87 In addi-
tion, supremacy concerns suggest that injunctive remedies must be
available to ensure state compliance with valid federal statutory law,
quite apart from whether due process of its own force requires such
remedies.8
8
2. Justifications for Due Process's Differing Remedial Require-
ments for Old and New Property Deprivations
a. Corrective Justice and Old Property
Granting that due process does not require the same remedies
for all types of property, the issue arises as to why old property should
be more deserving of a damages remedy than new. The differential
remedies may reflect stronger claims for corrective justice in cases of
old than new property.8 9 Corrective justice aims to take away the
85 See supra note 81.
86 See Fallon, supra note 70, at 348 (indicating that Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981), as a form of abstention, does not apply to requests for prospective relief); idat
370 (stating that remedies directed to confining or stopping ongoing wrongdoing are
the most basic constitutionally).
87 See Fallon& Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1789-90 (noting stronger claim to indi-
vidual remediation in cases of continuing coercion as distinguished, for example,
from governmental violations of the Contracts Clause). But cf. City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that plaintiff could seek damages but lacked
standing to seek injunction for police choke-hold practice).
88 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (noting need
to make sovereign immunity meaningful, while at the same time preventing violations
of federal law). See generally Vfzquez, supra note 10, at 1782 (emphasizing Supremacy
Clause as source of remedial rights against state officers).
89 General theories of constitutional remedies have indicated that remedies must
be adequate overall to keep government in check, and additionally, should provide
individual remediation. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1736. The require-
ment of individual remediation, however, is a more easily compromised principle
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wrongful gain of the wrongdoer and restore it to the victim.90 Both
causation of injury to the plaintiff and wrongdoing on the part of the
defendant are required to justify the wealth transfer.9'
Professor Jeffries has argued that our system of remedies against
government, consisting of sovereign immunity combined with individ-
ual officer liability qualified by good faith immunity, results in dam-
ages being awarded largely in conformity with a model of corrective
justice.92 Jeffries's focus has been on defendants' fault as a predicate
for corrective justice. 93 For fundamental rights constitutional viola-
tions that do not involve wrongful motivation, the system of individual
officer immunities supplies the element of fault by holding individual
defendants liable only where they have acted unreasonably as to the
legality of their conduct.
94
In the context of mere property deprivations-that is, non-funda-
mental rights due process violations-the Court has indicated that it is
only "deliberate" deprivations that will count as due process violations
if the state does not provide adequate remedies. Thus the Court has
required an element of defendant fault as an element of the constitu-
than the first. See id The individual remediation principle seems to derive from an
implicit theory of corrective justice.
90 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories
of Tort Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 189 (1981).
91 SeeJeffries, supra note 64, at 94 (stating that under corrective justice theory,
injury and wrongdoing are necessary for a duty to rectify); see also Posner, supra note
90, at 190 (same); ErnestJ. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
407 (1987) (same).
92 SeeJeffries, supra note 64, at 100. Jeffries's claims that our liability system works
reasonably well may not be a claim that the Constitution requires sovereign immunity.
See Meltzer, supra note 53. Jeffries's defense of the results under current law, how-
ever, at a minimum indicates that he finds them compatible with the rule of law and
remedial aspirations that inhere in the Constitution.
93 Corrective justice need not serve instrumental ends. SeeJeffries, supra note 64,
at 88. Instrumental theories, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with corrective
justice. See Posner, supra note 90, at 198 (treating defendant's failure to take reason-
able precautions as unjust gain); cf L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YAIE L.J. 52, (1936) (discussing various ways to define
the defendant's benefit that will change the line between restitution and the more
inclusive category of reliance). Jeffries addresses instrumental reasons that a fault-
based government liability scheme makes sense. SeeJeffries, supra note 8, at 72-74.
He argues that strict governmental liability that requires government to internalize all
accident costs may deter socially desirable conduct and may undesirably lower govern-
mental activity levels. See id. at 74. More recently, Jeffries has argued that restricting
damages liability may encourage constitutional development and direct resources to-
ward future generations. SeeJeffries, supra note 77, at 90.
94 SeeJeffries, supra note 64, at 98.
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tional violation.95 A state deprivation of both old and new property
might be equally "deliberate," however that is defined;96 therefore, it
may be difficult to distinguish many cases of old and new property
based on the degree of defendant fault.
97
The distinction between new and old property, however, is one
addressed to the nature of the plaintiffs loss and not to the degree of
the defendant's fault. Plaintiff loss, moreover, as well as defendant
fault are elements of a claim to corrective justice. And it may be possi-
ble that the nature of the plaintiffs loss of traditional property calls
out more for restoration than does a loss of new property.
98
First, there is a longer tradition of protection of old property.
The history of constitutional remedies discussed above suggests that
greater claims to a remedy inhere in tortious deprivations of old prop-
erty than in wrongful deprivations of new property. The historical
willingness to impose individual liability on government officers for
trespassory harms even in the absence of individual fault in cases of
illegal taxation and other trespassory harms is some measure of the
perceived strength of plaintiffs claim to individual compensation in
cases of tortious deprivations of old property. This compares with the
historical absence of compelled remedies for payment on contracts or
other denials of statutorily-created expectations. 99
To argue that history supports stronger claims to compensation
for deprivations of old property than new perhaps just reiterates the
historical arguments above, and may amount to no more than an ar-
gument that old property is older than new property. But the histori-
95 SeeJeffries, supra note 8, at 55 (noting that the Court has required that depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property subject to due process must be deliberate).
96 SeeJeffries, supra note 64, at 94. What is wrongful is not necessarily defined in
Artistotle's corrective justice theory, other than to point to acts in some sense deliber-
ate; see also Posner, supra note 90, at 190 (noting that Aristotle associated fault with
deliberate, not merely voluntary, acts).
97 Perhaps one could argue that more "fault" is involved in depriving someone of
old rather than new property-that is, in causing a loss that disturbs the status quo
more. This seems, however, to duplicate the argument that the differing nature of
plaintiff's loss justifies a distinction between old and new property.
98 Cf Jules L. Coleman, Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CuI--
KENT L. REv. 451, 460 (1987) (arguing that whether the plaintiff has suffered a loss
which ought to be rectified is analytically distinct from the question of whether the
injurer has done something justifying his being held liable).
99 See Woolhandler, supra note 13, at 122-24 (discussing the Court's Contracts
Clause jurisprudence, in which trespass actions against officials, as distinguished from
positive law remedies against the state or its officials, were not subject to state legisla-
tive repeal or judicial abrogation).
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cal traditions manifest a notion that the status quo'00 (again, as partly
defined by historical traditions and law, as well as common sense and
"shared moral intuitions"101 ) rather than expectations have been
changed. 0 2 The fact that tort rather than contract is generally the
focus of corrective-justice literature' 03 may reflect the greater sense of
a loss to the victim when traditional interests in property (and bodily
integrity)' 04 as opposed to contractual or other expectations have
been trenched upon.
b. Old Property, New Property, and Private Power
Critiques of entitlement theory in the context of procedural due
process offer additional insights into why it may be normatively attrac-
tive to give greater protections to old rather than new property. The
argument is not merely one that old property is more worthy, but also
that there may be dangers in equating old and new property. In addi-
tion to arguing that protection of statutory entitlements under proce-
dural due process is insufficiently grounded in constitutional text and
history, 0 5 Stephen Williams and others have argued that protection
of new property has the potential to dilute protections for old prop-
100 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 93, at 56 (noting weaker claims for judicial
intervention to protect expectations as distinguished from restitution and reliance
interests, in that the "law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo").
101 See Fallon, supra note 70, at 319-20.
102 See Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 209
(1991) (noting that although law defines and protects even traditional property inter-
ests, we resist at some fundamental level the idea that law literally creates them); Ste-
phen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LE_,AL
STuD. 3, 10 (1983) (noting difference between state refereeing conditions under
which individuals engaged in production and exchange create wealth that the state
protects from the state, and having become the owner of wealth, transferring it to
others pursuant to conditional grants).
103 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare Economics in Nor-
mative Analysis of Law Enforcement 30 (Sept. 15, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 93, at 56 (observing that in moving
from remedies for restitution and reliance to loss of expectancy, "we pass, to use Aris-
totle's terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to that of distributive justice").
104 Corrective justice seeks simultaneously to take away defendant's wrongful gain
and restore the victim's wrongful loss. Cf Fuller & Perdue, supra note 93, at 56 (not-
ing that restitution, involving unjust impoverishment and unjust gain, states a
stronger case than does a loss of reliance interest without commensurate promissor
gain, and that both restitution and reliance state stronger claims for judicial interven-
tion than does a loss of expectancy interest). Traditional property cases may overall
(although not uniformly) present more certain and symmetrical gains and losses than
new property cases.
105 See Williams, supra note 102, at 20.
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erty by throwing older property and newer entitlements in the same
hopper.10 6 Old property, moreover, is worth preserving as a category
separate from new property and with undiluted protections, because
of its greater potential to provide individuals a base for meaningful
independence from government.
0 7
Williams thus suggests that due process protection of old prop-
erty serves as an important structural protection of freedom by en-
hancing private power, and that this protection might be diluted if
more positive-law forms of property are treated as equivalent for due
process purposes.'08 The I/orida Prepaid cases, by requiring systems of
damages remedies for old property, have the advantage of reinforcing
a baseline of constitutional protection for traditional common law in-
terests as against governmental encroachments. 10 9 And it may not be
too bizarre to suggest that the Court is willing to recognize such a
baseline for old property because the Court does not have to apply it
to statutorily-created expectations." 0
It might, however, be argued that Congress's creation of remedial
rights against state governments, as in the Florida Prepaid cases, en-
hances private power as against state governments. Thus, one could
argue that greater protection of old over new property in the recent
sovereign immunity cases does not reinforce private power against
government but undermines it. This statutory enhancement of pri-
vate power, however, remains dependent on the will of Congress.
What is more, Congress's enhancement of private power through new
property entitlements is at the expense of state power, which itself is
106 See Farina, supra note 102, at 200; Williams, supra note 102, at 13. A concern is
that government might by positive law allow for official discretion over even tradi-
tional property, in a way that undermines protection for such property. See Farina,
supra note 102, at 200. Admittedly, this is not an obvious problem directly presented
in the sovereign immunity cases, because in these cases Congress has attempted by
positive law to protect both old and new property. Nevertheless, a regime that distin-
guishes old and new property may end up providing less malleable protections for old
property. See infra text accompanying notes 108-14.
107 See Farina, supra note 102, at 209 (describing Williams's argument); Williams,
supra note 102, at 13 (critiquing Charles Reich's new property theories on grounds
that they must sacrifice the claims of traditional liberty and property that they should
serve as counterweights to government).
108 See Farina, supra note 102, at 209-10; Williams, supra note 102, at 13.
109 See Farina, supra note 102, at 201 (noting the problem of finding intrinsic
meaning to life, liberty, and property that is not dependent on positive law).
110 It may also not be too bizarre to suggest that congressional regulation of states
under the Commerce Clause may be more acceptable to the Court if states are not
liable for damages.
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an important counterweight to federal power.11 By contrast, protec-
tions for traditional property interests have more potential to provide
private power as a counterweight to all government, in that they imply
ajudicially enforceable baseline of rights as against both the state and
federal government, congressional desires to the contrary
notwithstanding.' 
1 2
One might here object that the argument that expanded rights
may dilute older rights suggests that we should never expand rights
for fear of diluting what we have. I am not, however, against the ex-
pansion of rights over time. Indeed, the historical analysis herein re-
lies heavily on a common law method.1i Nuanced treatment of
property that is deserving of damages remedies, however, may actually
be more helpful than not in encouraging the development and pres-
ervation of new rights over time.
14
c. Symmetry Between State Gain and Citizen Loss in Old
Property Cases
Behind sovereign immunity is a concern that unlimited damages
liability may undermine federalism by threatening the continued
existence of the states as viable political entities. I do not undertake
herein a full-blown defense of federalism' 15 but rather assume federal-
ism has advantages and that those advantages might be at risk if states
were subjected to unlimited liability at Congress's instance. It is naive
to claim that damages liability is not a threat to the financial integrity
of states,1 6 given our judicial system's treatment of perceived deep-
pocket defendants."17 Broad damages liability may be a greater threat
111 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 22, at 436 n.194 (citing various
authorities).
112 Cf Vfizquez, supra note 10, at 1783 (indicating that his Supremacy Clause
based rights to damages would not be abrogable by Congress as to constitutional viola-
tions and noting the undesirability of making relief against the states depend on a
congressional decision).
113 Cf Fallon, supra note 74, at 1261 (stating that arguments from precedent allow
underlying norms to undergo progressive reinterpretations).
114 See generally Jeffries, supra note 77; see also infra text accompanying notes
137-43.
115 See Meltzer, supra note 53 (adverting to various arguments for federalism); see
also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 22, at 437 n.194 (citing various authorities).
116 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1795 (stating that it is not always easy for
even a well-administered government to absorb the costs of officers' constitutional
violations); cf. Jeffries, supra note 8, at 50 (noting that juries were less likely to play
Robin Hood when an individual was a defendant).
117 The judicial system allows ruinous damages liability against corporations, re-
flecting a willingness to see them go out of existence if the damages they throw off as
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to states than to private business,"18 moreover, because of the diffi-
culty government may have in internalizing all the benefits of its
activities." 9
If the Court is going to provide for the possibility of damages
liability against states, however, liability for old property claims poses
less of a threat to states than liability for new property claims, because
in old property cases the state will presumptively be able to absorb the
loss. The corrective justice concerns discussed above suggest that in
many old property cases, the state will have internalized a benefit com-
mensurate with the loss it has caused the citizen. A typical case of a
deliberate loss of old property may involve illegal taxation, involving
symmetrical gains and losses. By contrast, in many new property
cases12 0-such as liability for false advertising"-damages may not as
determined by our judicial system are greater than benefits produced for their own-
ers. The practice assumes that our liability system works reasonably well at determin-
ing costs and benefits-a proposition coming increasingly under question. SeeW. Kip
Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act2, 52 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr.
2000) (presenting empirical and anecdotal evidence that sound risk analyses that
should show nonliability for negligence and eliminate the possibility of punitive dam-
ages instead lead jurors to impose greater sanctions). See generally Cass R. Sunstein et
al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE
L.. 2071 (1998) (concluding thatjurors' being asked to map their judgments on an
unbounded dollar scale potentially produces arbitrary awards). The Constitution
does not suggest similar indifference to the continued existence of the states. While
governments that do not overall enhance utility should not continue to exist, trusting
this issue to the vagaries of our jury system seems undesirable. Certainly the federal
government has always kept a reasonably tight rein on its own exposure to jury-as-
sessed liability.
118 See William F. Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private, 42 LAw & CoNTlvn,.
PROBS. 45, 51 (1978) (noting that it was perhaps assumed with respect to government
policy decisions that government actors can be relied on to take into account the
interests of third parties); Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 1110, 1186 (1981) (noting that there are some areas where both govern-
mental and officer liability are undesirable, and that for some activities we trust offi-
cials to have relatively balanced incentives to act in a socially desirable fashion).
119 See PETER SHUCK, SUING GovERNmENT 60-77 (1983) (discussing lesser ability of
government officials than private employees to appropriate the benefits of good per-
formance); Baxter, supra note 118, at 51 (discussing differences between government
and private entity incentives); Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under
Section 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 249, 278 (noting that
with the possible exception of certain independent proprietary entities, municipal
agencies are not usually motivated by the desire to maximize profits).
120 Loaning money to the state may present a special case of symmetrical gains
and losses that nevertheless do not call for redress. Lenders, however, are aware that
they must rely on the full faith and credit of the state, and interest rates reflect the
risk.
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predictably match gains that the state has been able to internalize.121
The experience with awarding damages for lost statutory expectations
under § 1983 discussed below tends to confirm that, in many in-
stances, government has not internalized a gain commensurate with
the damages the plaintiff seeks to recover. 122
The other side of difficulty in internalizing benefits in cases of
new property deprivations, moreover, is that the state and its officials
may have fewer incentives to violate the law in the first place, thereby
making damages remedies less necessary.123 For example, a state gov-
ernment may have incentives more closely resembling profit motives
(and those incentives may be translated to their officers in the ab-
sence of damages remedies) to collect an illegal tax than to withhold
federally-mandated welfare benefits under restricted appropria-
tions.' 24 Thus concerns for deterring government illegality may be
somewhat alleviated in new property cases; 125 individual liability126
(where available' 27) and injunctive remedies may suffice to keep the
121 As noted above, regulatory takings claims may be in the new property category.
122 See infra text accompanying notes 149-56.
123 See Fallon& Meltzer, supra note 31, at 1736 (stating that our system of constitu-
tional remedies calls for a structure of remedies adequate to keep government within
bounds).
124 This would be truer when taxes are collected from out-of-staters than from in-
staters. See id. at 1827 (noting the lack of political safeguards when taxation involves
Commerce Clause violations). One could posit a situation in which government
might gain the same amount of money in collecting taxes or withholding welfare.
Nevertheless, government as an entity is engaged in trying to enrich itself with tax
collection efforts, while in welfare cases the state generally is engaging in a program
in which it has already engaged to divest itself of funds. New property cases that do
not fall at the extreme of benefits disbursement may be somewhat harder to distin-
guish from old property cases in terms of government incentives-for example, fed-
eral regulations of the employment relationship and wage and hour laws.
125 See Kramer& Sykes, supra note 119, at 286 (noting that in the public sector it is
unclear if greater cost internalization would improve or weaken resource allocation).
126 Incentives for compliance should remain fairly strong where individuals are
liable for damages. See id. at 289 (noting that vicarious liability of a municipality,
whether strict or based on negligence, may reduce employee incentives to avoid the
occurrence of the wrong).
127 The fact that even a nonimmune official is in the picture does not mean that
relief will be available. To comply with sovereign immunity doctrine, the litigant will
need to state a good claim for relief against the individual. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine,
119 S. Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999) (stating that suits may be pursued against individual
officers for "wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the officer himself"). Thus in
cases where a state officer is engaged in illegal commercial activities on behalf of a
state entity, such as alleged false advertising, federal courts might look to whether a
similarly situated individual employee of a private entity could plausibly be held lia-
ble. SeeVizquez, supra note 10, at 1794 (suggesting broad ability of Congress to make
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government reasonably in check without the additional requirement
of damages. Even when the state has engaged in activities that enable
it to internalize gains from illicit behavior,128 however, liability for lost
expectations enhances the threat of unpredictable (and even unrea-
sonably imposed) ruinous liability.129
B. Recovery for Loss of Nontraditional Interests in Fundamental
Rights Cases
Looking outside of the procedural due process cases to modern
developments in constitutional remedies, other potential grounds
emerge for critique of the Court's decisions. It might be argued that
defining the Due Process Clause as requiring, in non-fundamental
rights cases, monetary remedies only for deprivations of traditional
property interests runs counter to the loosening of the hold of the
common law in the area of remedies for fundamental rights viola-
tions. Indeed, in fundamental rights constitutional litigation, empha-
sis has shifted from the nature of the plaintiff's injury to the nature of
the defendant's wrong as the source of the cause of action. As part of
this development, standing in constitutional cases has expanded be-
yond protection of a limited set of common law interests. Closer ex-
amination of these developments, however, may help to confirm a
general sense that deprivations of traditional common law interests
present stronger claims for compensatory remedies based on correc-
tive justice concerns than deprivations of new property.
individual officers liable, but also suggesting liability at least as broad as that for simi-
larly situated officers and directors of private entities). Many regulatory programs,
such as wage and hour legislation, however, may involve activities for which it may be
difficult to find an individual wrongdoer whom courts are likely to hold liable. See
Jeffries, supra note 8, at 60-67 (discussing cases under § 1983 where the courts
deemed an individual remedy unavailable, including cases involving benefits, Medi-
care and Medicaid reimbursement, and fines for pollution).
128 Areas where incentives approach those of private entities, however, may also
involve more personal benefit to an official from violating federal statutory rights.
This in turn suggests that individual liability may be available.
129 When engaged in some commercial behavior, the states may have similar in-
centives to violate the law as private parties, and concomitantly may have internalized
a gain that would be available to pay damagesjudgments. This argument suggests the
possible wisdom of the rejected waiver concept of Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S.
184 (1964). See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2234-35 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
As noted, the Court has largely foreclosed the waiver argument. See id at
2226-28. The waiver concept might have proved more attractive to the Court if the
commerce power were not so broad. Nevertheless, a line might still be drawn for
waiver by resurrecting a governmental/proprietary distinction. For discussion of po-
tential avenues around Seminole Tribe, see generally Meltzer, supra note 8, at 49-61.
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Exparte Young °30 manifested an expansion of injunctive remedies
beyond direct trespasses' 3 1-although notably in injunction cases.
The plaintiff's common law injury became less emphasized as an ele-
ment of the claim in favor of emphasis on the defendant's breach of
duty-and a breach of duty that seemed to derive more from the Con-
stitution than from the common law.132 A plaintiff was still required
to show an injury, but plaintiff's injury or standing for injunctive relief
in constitutional cases could include economic expectations in an-
other's compliance with the Constitution-often even without show-
ing a common law trespassory harm.
The decreasing importance of stating a loss of a traditional com-
mon law interest spilled over to damages in Monroe v. Pape.13 3 While
Monroe involved a traditional trespass, like Young it emphasized as the
source of the right to relief, the defendant's violation of the Constitu-
tion rather than the defendant's violation of a traditional common law
duty impacting on the plaintiff's traditional common law rights.'3 4 As
an outgrowth of the emphasis on the Constitution as the source of the
right to relief, we now have § 1983 actions that, for example, provide
damages for a discharge from otherwise at-will employment that vio-
lates the First Amendment.
Does the move off of traditional common law interests and the
corresponding emphasis on defendant's constitutional violation in
§ 1983 cases addressing constitutional violations suggest that it is inap-
propriate to resort to traditional common law interests as a limitation
on remedies required under the Due Process Clause for nonfunda-
mental rights violations? Not necessarily. First, fundamental rights vi-
olations present a different problem from non-fundamental property
deprivations. 35 Fundamentality is a label indicating that the right
and duty at issue are important and call for extra judicial scrutiny;
130 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
131 See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 8, at 38 (stating that Young addressed conduct
probably not tortious under traditional common law understandings); Kenneth E.
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 H~Av. L. REv. 645, 651
(1973) (discussing Young as a case in which the Court did not require the plaintiff to
allege a concrete common law injury).
132 See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 22, at 460-61.
133 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
134 See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment protected constitutionally-derived interests in privacy that were
not necessarily tied to common law property concepts); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1967) (allowing seizure of mere evidence, in addition to contraband
and instrumentalities of crime in which state had a superior property interest).
135 Use of § 1983 for statutory violations is addressed below. Procedural due pro-
cess cases are addressed above.
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retrospective damages liability supplies additional occasions for such
scrutiny. Saying the duty is of special concern may indicate that the
extra measure of deterrence provided by retrospective damages reme-
dies is often warranted in such contexts-without regard to whether
the plaintiff's loss involves old or new property.
3 6
What is more, the expansion of standing beyond common law
injuries in the fundamental rights constitutional cases has had more
uniformly felicitous results in injunction cases than in damages
cases. 137 Indeed, the case law sometimes presents examples of re-
quests for damages that seem strikingly inappropriate from a correc-
tive justice standpoint. For example, a policeman who foregoes
Miranda warnings could arguably be subject to damages remedies
3 8
just as could a policeman who used excessive force in making an
arrest-even though the latter case (most people would agree) states
a stronger claim to a monetary remedy. In Miranda violation cases,
the victim will generally have received some individual remedy by vir-
tue of the excludability of the Miranda-violative statement from the
case in chief.'3 9 Not surprisingly, some circuits have found no dam-
ages remedies for Miranda violations, manifesting a lack of consensus
136 SeeJeffies, supra note 64, at 91 (questioning the persistent impression that
unconstitutionality is a reliable proxy for severity of harm). Cases dealing with argua-
ble constitutional violations that are not in the fundamental rights category encom-
pass a broad potential range of official behavior-behavior that by definition has not
been singled out for heightened constitutional scrutiny. To narrow this broad range,
some delineation of the circumstances in which governmental wrongs (statutory or
common law) cross over to actionable federal constitutional violations becomes neces-
sary. Some of this sorting occurs by enhancing the defendant's wrong: for example,
requirements of conscience-shocking behavior, deliberateness, or systemic harms.
The nature of the plaintiff's loss supplies an additional sorting device, particularly
appropriate for deciding when a failure to provide a system of damages remedies is a
constitutional violation.
137 See id. at 100 (noting that as originally conceived, most constitutional rights
were not standards of compensatory liability).
138 See California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir.
1999) (recognizing a claim for a Miranda violation even if the statements may not
have caused the interogee harm at trial, although requiring some coercion in addi-
tion to Miranda violation); Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1251 (9th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (rejecting claim of qualified immunity as to Miranda claim even though the
defendant was never tried, although requiring coercion in addition to bare Miranda
violation). The victim will have to show emotional distress or some other compensa-
ble loss. See infra text accompanying notes 144-45.
139 See Butts, 195 F.3d at 1044. Admittedly, the State had incentives to violate
rights and internalized a law-enforcement benefit of being able to use the Miranda
violative statement for possible impeachment and other collateral uses. But the na-
ture of the plaintiff's loss from the State's collateral use of truthful statements seems
undeserving of damages remedies.
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on the propriety of this remedy.140 Providing the full complement of
remedies not only may provide compensation in cases with weak cor-
rective justice claims, but also may stifle constitutional develop-
ment.141 John Jeffries has pointed out the unlikelihood that the
Court would have imposed Miranda requirements in the absence of
the Court's then-available option of limiting the retroactive effects of
its decision.142 Add to this a requirement of retrospective damages
remedies and the odds against judicial recognition of Miranda rights
become overwhelming. 143 A widely available damages remedy could
possibly negatively influence the continued recognition of Miranda.
The Court has mitigated the effects of widened standing by nar-
rowing compensable injuries (that is, standing) in constitutional dam-
ages cases. In Carey v. Piphus,144 in which the plaintiffs claimed
damages due to a lack of a hearing for a high school suspension, the
Court limited damages to proved injury to common law interests.
145
Thus, while standing for injunctive relief under § 1983 may require
some particularization of injury, standing for damages requires even
further particularization. True, emotional distress and any demon-
strable economic harm (not merely a harm to traditional property in-
terests) remain presumptively compensable under Carey. Thus,
monetary remedies in fundamental rights constitutional cases are
available for a larger category of plaintiff injuries than in cases of non-
fundamental property violations. Nevertheless, the limitation of dam-
ages in § 1983 cases alleging fundamental rights violations may reflect
the lessened sense of propriety of damages remedies for the wide
range of injuries that may suffice for standing in § 1983 injunctive
actions.
Another judicial response to the wide array of injuries that are
potentially compensable under 1983 has been the development of in-
dividual officer immunities. ForJohnJeffries, immunities help to sup-
140 See id. (Schwarzer, J., dissenting) (citing cases where failure to give Miranda
warnings did not give rise to a damages action). There are a number of stumbling
blocks to a damages remedy. One is that a violation may not occur unless the state-
ment is introduced at trial of the case in chief. Introducing the statement for im-
peachment will not violate Miranda. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In
addition, there is an argument that Miranda violations are not true constitutional
violations, but rather violations of a subconstitutional prophylactic rule. See Connecti-
cut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987).
141 See generally Jeifries, supra note 77.
142 See id. at 98.
143 Jeffries also discusses the arresting example of requiring damages in school
desegregation cases. See id. at 99-100.
144 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
145 See id. at 264-65.
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ply an element of defendant fault that is often missing in modem
constitutional violations. The old regime of strict liability did not nec-
essarily require fault in the sense of a state of mind about the law, but
it did require trespassory invasions of traditional vested property inter-
ests. As noted above, this availability of remedies without defendant
fault shows the historically-perceived strength of plaintiffs claim to an
individual remedy when trespassory harms to traditional interests were
at issue. Although modem qualified immunities address defendant
fault rather than the nature of plaintiffs loss, it is possible that immu-
nities respond in part not only to the absence of fault in many consti-
tutional violations, 146 but also to the wider range of plaintiff losses that
are currently compensable. The range of municipal liability-where
immunities are not available-sometimes presents examples of dam-
ages being awarded in situations where one might think injunctions
would sufficiently answer the need for control of defendants and
plaintiff's entitlement to a remedy.
147
C. Recovery for Loss of Expectations of Compliance with Law in
Statutory Cases
It is not merely in fundamental rights constitutional cases that the
Court has expanded remedies against government or its officers be-
yond traditional property interests, but also in the area of statutory
violations as well. Thus the Court's distinction between old and new
property when federal statutes are violated may seem out of step with
the expanded universe of plaintiff injuries that can suffice for stand-
ing in nonconstitutional administrative law cases and § 1983 cases in-
volving statutory violations. Once again, however, the results in these
cases may suggest that an old/new property distinction is appropriate
for the availability of damages remedies. The cases involving statutory
damages liability often present claims where corrective justice claims
are weak, and where the state had not internalized a monetary gain
comparable to plaintiffs claimed loss.
In the area of administrative law, those with standing came to in-
clude regulatory beneficiaries, whose injury could include lost expec-
tations from the failure of government to subject a regulated party to
additional regulation. Protected expectations could include lost prof-
its (e.g., due to an agency's under-regulation of competitors'48), and
even aesthetic interests. Nevertheless, these expansions have primar-
ily involved cases seeking injunctive relief, and thus provide little if
146 See generaUyJeffiies, supra note 8.
147 See id. at 58.
148 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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any support for a notion that damages remedies must be available for
lost statutory expectations.
Perhaps more relevant then are those cases in which the federal
courts have recognized damages remedies against local governmental
bodies for violations of federal statutes under § 1983.149 As is true in
§ 1983 fundamental rights constitutional claims, hurt feelings and loss
of economic expectations may be compensable in § 1983 statutory
claims. While individual officer immunities mean that many such
cases will not result in damages remedies against individuals, local gov-
ernments remain vulnerable to such claims for their customs and poli-
cies on a strict liability basis. 150
The Supreme Court has countenanced a number of cases where
plaintiffs have sought damages under § 1983 for violations of federal
statutes. In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,151 for exam-
ple, the Court held that the city was amenable to damages liability for
regulating a labor dispute that was preempted by the NLRA. In
Livadas v. Bradshaw,15 2 the plaintiff sought as a possible remedy dam-
ages commensurate with a lost statutory penalty that the plaintiff
would have recovered from her former employer had the official pur-
sued an enforcement action that the official mistakenly believed pre-
empted. 153 Another case involved underpayments of welfare,154 while
still another sought recovery for public housing tenants' payment of
surcharges for excess utility use that did not comply with federal
regulations .155
The potential damages liability in these cases does little to inspire
a sense that expectations of government compliance with federal stat-
utory law always state a strong claim for monetary relief. In the wel-
149 Because § 1983 kicks in as a possible remedy if a particular federal statute does
not provide its own detailed scheme of remedies, it may tend to be used to enforce
statutory norms that are directed more to government rather than to more general
commercial activities.
150 But cf. Jeffries, supra note 8, at 58 (noting strategems Court uses to avoid strict
liability for local governments); id. (noting that custom and policy requirement for
municipal liability under § 1983 may approach a fault requirement).
151 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
152 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
153 Id. at 114 (noting that plaintiff was seeking damages from the commissioner if
her claim against the employer were time-barred due to the commissioner's inaction
on the claim due to mistaken view of preemptive effect of federal law on the state law
claim for penalties).
154 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 (1980).
155 See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 422
& n.4 (1987). The payment of a user fee that was in excess of regulations but not
otherwise unfair would seem to resemble a contractual claim.
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fare cases, the claims to corrective justice are weak, even if distributive
justice may favor awards. And in the preemption cases, the govern-
ment will not have internalized a gain commensurate with the dam-
ages it may be asked to absorb. 156 The cases thus suggest the wisdom
of a distinction between old and new property for due process re-
quirements of a damages remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The historical record supports the Court's refusal to treat sover-
eign immunity as merely a forum allocation device. It also supports
the Court's distinguishing old and new property for due process re-
quirements of damages remedies. Requiring a system of damages
remedies for deprivations of old but not new property not only pro-
vides monetary remedies in cases where corrective justice suggests
they are more appropriate, but also may prevent dilution of remedies
for old property rights and prevent unpredictable burdens on state
treasuries. Experience with damages liability for nontraditional inter-
ests, particularly in cases under § 1983 for violation of federal statutes,
suggests the wisdom of distinguishing among injuries deserving of
damages remedies.
156 Other problems with such liability have been discussed by Professor Jeffries,
such as a lack of defendant fault and undesirable effects on government activity levels.
See Jeffiies, supra note 8, at 74 (stating that liability may affect government activity
levels in undesirable ways). In addition, federal preemption does not seem to suggest
that there should be a buffer zone of nonimmunized uncertainty beyond the pre-
empted area. See Michael G. Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions,
and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEo. L.J. 1493, 1548-49, 1559-62 (1989) (questioning
the propriety of damages awards in preemption cases).
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